United Nations S/2010/349

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 June 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 30 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to my earlier letter to you dated 4 June 2010 (S/2010/281), in which my Government brought to the attention of the Security Council the armed attack on 26 March 2010 by North Korea against the Republic of Korea Navy ship *Cheonan*, and also respond to the letter from the Permanent Representative of North Korea to you dated 29 June 2010 (S/2010/343).

As clearly stated and presented by the Republic of Korea in my previous letter and during the informal interactive dialogue of the Security Council held on 14 June 2010, the findings of the Joint Civilian-Military Investigation Group concluded that an underwater explosion caused by a torpedo fired by a North Korean submarine had sunk the *Cheonan*, resulting in the loss of 46 lives. This conclusion was based on material evidence obtained through the scientific and objective investigation, carried out by experts from Australia, Canada, Sweden, the United Kingdom, the United States and the Republic of Korea.

The armed attack by North Korea against the Republic of Korea Navy ship constitutes a threat to peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and beyond. It is also a clear violation of, among other things, the 1953 Korean Armistice Agreement. The Republic of Korea brought this hostile attack to the attention of the Security Council, and we urge the Council to meet its responsibility to address this issue in an expeditious and credible manner.

Regarding North Korea's proposal for so-called high-level military talks, as set out in the above-mentioned letter from North Korea, it should be noted that there already exists an established mechanism for the discussion of such cases of violations of the Korean Armistice Agreement.

Under the terms of the Armistice Agreement, it is the mission of the Military Armistice Commission to deal with violations of the Agreement. The United Nations Command (UNC)-(North) Korean People's Army (KPA) General Officer-level talks have been the designated forum for all Armistice-related issues following agreement between UNC and KPA in 1998. Since then, the UNC-KPA General Officer-level talks have dealt with other cases of violations of the Armistice Agreement by North Korea, including its submarine infiltration in June 1998, as well as naval hostilities in June 1999 and July 2002.

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Please recycle

In this context, the UNC Military Armistice Commission has twice — on 26 and 27 June 2010 — proposed to North Korea that UNC-KPA General Officer-level talks be held to discuss the armed attack against the Republic of Korea Navy ship *Cheonan*. The KPA, however, has thus far declined to attend these talks. If North Korea has a genuine intention to discuss this matter in military channels, it should respond positively to this proposal.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Park** In-kook
Permanent Representative of the Republic of Korea to the United Nations

United Nations S/2010/350

Security Council

Distr.: General
30 June 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 30 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Eritrea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Let me from the outset welcome the report of the Secretary-General on Eritrea (S/2010/327). While the report is not free of inaccuracies and repeats of the erroneous and unfounded allegations made against Eritrea, including the accusations that Eritrea had invaded Djiboutian territory when in fact it had not, the facts and analysis that it presents underline the sheer injustice of the sanctions imposed on Eritrea. The developments over the past few months on the issues of both Eritrea-Djibouti and Somalia, which the report highlights, show that there is no longer any pretext to keep the sanctions in place.

As noted in the report, the agreement signed by the Governments of Eritrea and Djibouti with the facilitation of the Government of Qatar, whose good offices were first requested by Djibouti, is a welcome development.

On Somalia, Eritrea has continued to articulate its considered views and exert efforts for sustainable peace. It participated in the Istanbul Conference on the basis of a gracious invitation extended to it by the Government of Turkey and the United Nations. It would not be appropriate to attribute interpretations to this participation other than Eritrea's sincere desire, together with other participants, for a durable and courageous solution. In Istanbul, Eritrea reiterated that the efforts to find a solution should be guided by certain principles:

- That there can be no military solution to the conflict in Somalia
- That the only real prospect for a lasting resolution of the Somali problem lies in an inclusive political process
- That a durable solution for Somalia can be the outcome only of a Somali-owned and -driven process

Eritrea concurs with the Secretary-General's view of the importance of compliance with the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission decisions for the promotion of peace and stability in the Horn of Africa. Clearly the time has come, and justice makes it imperative, for the Security Council, which has unjustifiably shied away from the issue, to take tangible measures to compel Ethiopia to withdraw from the sovereign Eritrean territories that it is occupying in flagrant violation of the United Nations Charter and international law.

10-43197 (E) 010710

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In his report, the Secretary-General, without giving any specifics, suggests that Eritrea needs to do more. Obviously, all countries in the world need to do more. Clearly, Ethiopia needs to respect the decision of the Boundary Commission and end its illegal occupation of Eritrean territory. As for the Security Council, justice and fairness demand that it lift the sanctions that it unjustifiably imposed on Eritrea.

I would be most grateful if the present letter could be issued as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Araya **Desta**
Ambassador, Permanent Representative

United Nations A/64/853–S/2010/351

General Assembly
Security Council

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2 July 2010
English
Original: Arabic

General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 15
The situation in the Middle East

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Identical letters dated 29 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On instructions of my Government, I transmit herewith a letter of complaint concerning the abduction of Lebanese citizen Imad Hassan Atwi from Lebanese territory by Israeli enemy forces on 27 June 2010 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the sixty-fourth session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 15, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Nawaf **Salam**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 29 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Lebanon to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

On 27 June 2010, at 3 p.m., Israeli enemy forces kidnapped Lebanese citizen Imad Hassan Atwi, while he was herding his flock inside Lebanese territory on the outskirts of the village of Saddanah, located between Shab'a and Kafr Shuba. Israeli enemy forces bound, blindfolded and beat him in full view of United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) personnel, who attempted to intervene. But the hostile Israeli forces quickly withdrew into the occupied Shab'a Farms, dragging Mr. Atwi on the ground more than 300 metres. They led him into a tent behind the Blue Line where they beat him and tortured him into unconsciousness. Israeli enemy forces then took him into the Occupied Palestinian Territory where he was interrogated by Israeli intelligence. On 28 June 2010, at 2.15 p.m., approximately 24 hours after having kidnapped him, Israeli enemy forces handed over Mr. Atwi to UNIFIL at the Naqurah crossing. The Force in turn handed him over to the Lebanese Army, which took him to hospital because of his extensive bruises, contusions and other serious physical injuries. This act is a flagrant violation of Lebanese sovereignty, Security Council resolution 1701 (2006), international law and international humanitarian law. It affirms yet again Israel's disdain for international resolutions and determination to pursue its aggressive and provocative policies, and the threat that Israel persistently poses to international peace and security.

United Nations S/2010/352

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 July 2010

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Thirteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) since the previous report of the Secretary-General was issued, on 26 February 2010 (S/2010/105).

2. The situation in the area of operations of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) remained generally stable during the reporting period. The cessation of hostilities established in August 2006 between Israel and Lebanon continued to hold, enabling the parties to enjoy the longest period of stability in their recent history. Yet, although the parties remained committed to the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), a number of violations occurred and no progress was recorded with regard to key obligations under the resolution. Amid allegations of continued arms transfers to Hizbullah, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006), a perceptible increase in tension between the parties was recorded during the reporting period. That raised the spectre of a miscalculation by either party leading to a resumption of hostilities, with potentially devastating consequences for Lebanon and the region.

3. Nevertheless, the functioning of the national unity Government in Lebanon over the past six months has translated into a broadening consensus among the country's leaders regarding the maintenance of domestic stability. Municipal elections were held throughout Lebanon during the month of May in a generally calm and peaceful atmosphere, which was disrupted only by a few unconnected, localized incidents.

4. Bilateral relations between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic have continued to make progress. President Michel Sleiman met with President Bashar Al-Assad in Damascus on 15 June. Prime Minister Saad Hariri also met with President Al-Assad in Damascus on 18 and 30 May. Furthermore, a delegation of high-ranking Lebanese officials visited the Syrian capital twice during the reporting period for a review of agreements between the two countries.

5. The Gaza flotilla incident that occurred on 31 May raised tension in the region and reverberated strongly in Lebanon. A number of public demonstrations of protest against Israel and of solidarity with the victims were held throughout the country.

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II. Implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006)

6. Since the issuance of my previous report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006), Lebanese security agencies have continued to coordinate their investigations of alleged Israeli spy networks in Lebanon.

A. Situation in the UNIFIL area of operations

7. The situation in the mission's area of operations remained stable and generally quiet during the reporting period. The Governments of Lebanon and Israel reaffirmed their commitment to the cessation of hostilities and the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

8. The Israel Defense Forces continued their occupation of the northern part of Ghajar village and an adjacent area of land north of the Blue Line, in violation of resolution 1701 (2006). Notwithstanding the obligation of Israel to withdraw from the area, UNIFIL was actively engaged with both parties to facilitate such a withdrawal on the basis of its proposal of August 2008. Over the past three months, UNIFIL and the Office of the United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon have held a number of talks with senior representatives of both parties. The discussions have recently intensified with a view to reaching a conclusion regarding this long-standing issue without further delay. In the latest development, on 14 June the Government of Lebanon conveyed to UNIFIL in writing its position on the Israeli response to date concerning the Force's proposal, reasserting Lebanese sovereignty over the area, rejecting changes to the proposal and reaffirming the willingness of Lebanon to continue discussions in the tripartite forum.

9. Israel Defense Forces aircraft — mostly unmanned aerial vehicles but also an increasing number of fighter jets — continued to make almost daily intrusions into Lebanese airspace. The overflights constitute violations of resolution 1701 (2006) and of Lebanese sovereignty. UNIFIL protested against all the air violations and asked Israel to cease them immediately. The Government of Lebanon also protested against the violations and demanded that they cease immediately. The Government of Israel maintained that the overflights were security measures that would be necessary until all relevant Security Council resolutions had been implemented, citing in particular the alleged lack of enforcement of the arms embargo as the reason for their continuation.

10. There were several incidents near the Blue Line and ground violations of the Blue Line from the Lebanese side during the reporting period. On 13 April, a tense stand-off occurred between the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces in the vicinity of the Lebanese village of Abbasiya, as work was being undertaken by the Israel Defense Forces south of the Blue Line but north of the technical fence. The situation was quickly defused by the mission's intervention and liaison with the parties. On 16 April, a group of Lebanese civilians, led by a Lebanese member of Parliament, demonstrated against the earlier Israel Defense Forces works in the area. The demonstrators crossed the Blue Line, dismantled a concertina-wire fence and placed Lebanese flags on the Israeli technical fence. Lebanese Armed Forces personnel subsequently crossed the Blue Line to put an end to the demonstration and return the civilians north of the Blue Line.

11. On 23 April, another demonstration, led by the same Lebanese member of Parliament, gathered close to the Blue Line, in the Shab'a farms area. A group of four Lebanese civilians, ignoring the warnings of UNIFIL, crossed the Blue Line and photographed the area. Subsequently, Lebanese Armed Forces personnel persuaded the civilians to return north of the Blue Line.

12. Throughout those two incidents, UNIFIL was in contact with both parties and emphasized the primary responsibility of the parties to respect the Blue Line in its entirety as identified by the United Nations, as well as the need to act with maximum restraint and to refrain from any action that could heighten tension in the area. Lebanese officials, while acknowledging that Lebanese civilians had crossed the Blue Line on 16 and 23 April, conveyed to UNIFIL the limitations faced by the Lebanese Armed Forces in physically stopping Lebanese civilians from attempting to gain access to what they consider Lebanese lands occupied by Israel south of the Blue Line. Nonetheless, they reaffirmed the continued commitment of the Government of Lebanon to respecting the Blue Line in its entirety and pledged their full support for the mission in preventing such violations. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces are discussing how to improve security control and monitoring in these sensitive areas in order to prevent further Blue Line violations.

13. In addition, a number of mostly inadvertent ground violations of the Blue Line were committed, primarily by Lebanese shepherds and farmers tending livestock or working in their fields. Construction workers on the Lebanese side of the Hasbani River, to the south of Ghajar, violated the Blue Line on two occasions with their building equipment, temporarily increasing tension in the area. At least four violations by civilians in the same area also occurred. Those violations highlighted the need for continued progress in the visible marking of the Blue Line. UNIFIL and Lebanese Armed Forces soldiers continued to take action to warn the local population about the position of the Blue Line in an effort to prevent inadvertent violations. Furthermore, on 17 March a foreign national was arrested by the Lebanese Armed Forces for having violated the Blue Line near Addaisseh, and on 4 April a UNIFIL patrol intercepted an apparent attempt at smuggling from Ghajar into Lebanon. The perpetrator subsequently fled back into the village. In addition, verbal abuse and threatening gestures were exchanged by the sides across the Blue Line on several occasions, involving both military personnel and civilians.

14. Steady progress continues to be made in the process of visibly marking the Blue Line. Both parties recently confirmed their agreement to mark a fifth sector, bringing to 38 km the total length of the Blue Line agreed to be marked thus far. As part of the project, UNIFIL demining teams clear minefields and dispose of unexploded ordnance in order to allow access for the measuring of coordinates and the construction of Blue Line markers. Construction work by the Lebanese Armed Forces on the first stage of the Blue Line road project — in which existing roads are being linked through the construction of 11 road connections — is ongoing, with support being provided by UNIFIL engineering assets.

15. UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces maintained their respective installations and continued their respective daily operational activities, comprising patrols, checkpoints and observation points, and UNIFIL continued its helicopter patrols. In addition, the two forces continued their joint operational activities, including an average of 15 counter-rocket-launching operations during each 24-hour period and daily coordinated foot patrols along the Blue Line, and operated 12 co-located

checkpoints, six of which are on the Litani River. As called for in resolution 1884 (2009), efforts between the two forces to increase the efficiency of their coordinated activities were ongoing. The Lebanese Armed Forces deployment in the UNIFIL area of operations remained at the level of three heavy brigades. The brigades were complemented by one mechanized battalion and two anti-tank companies, for a total Lebanese Armed Forces strength of some 6,500 soldiers.

16. Moreover, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces continued to conduct mostly tactical joint exercises, including one to improve the coordination among the UNIFIL battalion, sector mobile reserves and the Lebanese Armed Forces. Four mediation skills training sessions were conducted to provide Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL officers with conflict sensitivity and conflict resolution skills. The Maritime Task Force continued to provide regular training to Lebanese naval forces at sea and on land.

17. In general, UNIFIL exercised freedom of movement throughout its area of operations, carrying out approximately 10,000 patrols each month. On several occasions, however, mission patrols were temporarily halted by local civilians. In the most serious incident, on 4 March, civilians blocked the route of a UNIFIL patrol investigating, in coordination with the Lebanese Armed Forces, the firing of automatic weapons in the village of As-Suwwanan (Sector West). While carrying out a foot patrol in the village, three UNIFIL personnel were slightly injured, and two UNIFIL vehicles were damaged during a scuffle with civilians who stopped the patrol. On 15 April, UNIFIL military Geographic Information System personnel working in the vicinity of Qabrikha (Sector West) were stopped by a group of four unarmed persons who blocked the road with their vehicles and prevented the mission personnel from continuing their activity or moving away. They took a UNIFIL computer, Global Positioning System equipment and documentation and threatened the peacekeepers. On 17 May, a group of civilians confronted a team of UNIFIL military police investigating a minor traffic accident and took a camera from them. On 21 May, civilians, believing that a UNIFIL patrol in Khirbat Silm (Sector West) had taken photographs of the area, took two small handheld computers from the patrol. On 8 June, UNIFIL military close-protection personnel were stopped by unarmed persons near Ain Ebel, in Sector West, who demanded that they hand over their Global Positioning System equipment. The UNIFIL personnel accompanied the civilians to the Aytaash Shab municipality, where they agreed to hand over the equipment. Subsequently, the UNIFIL vehicle was searched and additional items, including maps, notebooks and working documents, were taken. The Lebanese authorities were able to retrieve all the items and to return them to UNIFIL intact. In addition, Lebanese civilians, including children and youths, threw stones at UNIFIL patrols on a number of occasions, which at times resulted in damage to mission vehicles. As previously reported, UNIFIL activities were occasionally monitored by civilians in various areas.

18. The UNIFIL Force Commander raised the subject of the mission's freedom of movement with the Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese Armed Forces at the highest levels. He received assurances from all officials that UNIFIL would enjoy unimpeded freedom of movement in its area of operations. The Lebanese Armed Forces emphasized the sensitivities involved in patrolling populated areas, which could be seen as intrusive and as infringing on the privacy of the population, or in carrying out specific technical activities that could be misinterpreted. The Lebanese Armed Forces suggested that UNIFIL personnel be accompanied by Lebanese

Armed Forces when carrying out such activities. While the concerns of the civilian population are understood by UNIFIL and taken into account to the extent possible, the mission is obliged to maintain its independent freedom of movement so that it can carry out its mandate.

19. Except with regard to the incidents described above, the attitude of the local population towards UNIFIL remained generally positive. The mission's Civil Affairs and Civilian-Military Cooperation units maintained close contact with local communities, seeking to swiftly resolve any issues that could give rise to problems and to mitigate the effects of the Force's significant operational activities on the daily lives of local residents. The provision of humanitarian, infrastructural, capacity-building and vocational training support through the activities of troop-contributing countries and projects funded from the UNIFIL budget reinforced the strong relations between UNIFIL and the local population.

20. UNIFIL continued to assist the Lebanese Armed Forces in taking steps towards the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and of UNIFIL, in accordance with resolution 1701 (2006).

21. The Government of Israel maintains that Hizbullah is continuing to build up its military presence and capacity, including within the UNIFIL area of operations. It also charges that Hizbullah has established a military structure inside the villages in southern Lebanon, which includes command and control posts, observation points, weapon storage facilities and specialized combat units. In addition, Israel claims that unauthorized weapons are being transferred into Lebanon, including into the UNIFIL area of operations. In cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces, the mission immediately investigates any claim regarding the illegal presence of armed personnel or weapons in the area if specific information is received. To date, UNIFIL has neither been provided with, nor found, evidence of the unauthorized transfer of arms into its area of operations.

22. UNIFIL remains determined to act with all necessary means within its mandate and to the full extent provided for in its rules of engagement. However, under its mandate, the mission cannot search private houses and properties unless there is credible evidence of a violation of resolution 1701 (2006), including an imminent threat of hostile activity emanating from that specific location. The Lebanese Armed Forces Command reconfirmed that it will act immediately on receiving evidence of unauthorized armed personnel or weapons in the area and put a stop to any illegal activity in contravention of resolution 1701 (2006) and relevant Government decisions, specifically those concerning the illegal presence of armed personnel and weapons south of the Litani River. Furthermore, UNIFIL routinely checked previously discovered former facilities of armed elements in the area of operations, including bunkers and caves, but found no indication that they had been reactivated and no evidence of new military infrastructure in its area of operations. On 18 June, during works being carried out on a road in the vicinity of Ghajar, UNIFIL engineers found approximately 340 kg of explosives buried in the ground. The explosives were in a deteriorating condition and apparently dated from the period before the hostilities in 2006. The explosives were not set to be activated, and there were no detonators attached. UNIFIL informed the Lebanese army and handed over the explosives to the Lebanese authorities.

23. The Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL continued to take coordinated measures aimed specifically at ensuring that there were no armed elements in the area, discovering and removing all weapons and related materiel that might still be present and preventing the possible unauthorized transfer of weapons across the Litani River. These remained objectives requiring long-term sustained efforts.

24. UNIFIL encountered no unauthorized armed personnel in the area of operations during the reporting period other than individuals armed with hunting rifles, who were engaged in hunting activities. In May, the Lebanese Armed Forces once again issued a statement reminding citizens that such activities were in violation of Lebanese law, as well as resolution 1701 (2006). The Lebanese Armed Forces detained a number of individuals and confiscated their weapons; others managed to flee. In addition, armed persons and weapons were present inside Palestinian refugee camps in the area of operations.

25. The Maritime Task Force continued to carry out its dual mandate of conducting maritime interdiction operations in the area of maritime operations and training the Lebanese naval forces. The Lebanese navy continued to contribute successfully to the maritime operations by hailing vessels approaching Lebanese ports and by compiling a recognized local maritime surface picture over the territorial waters with the assistance of the Coastal Radar Organization. Since its mission began, in October 2006, the Maritime Task Force has hailed and queried some 30,500 vessels. Since my previous report, an additional 259 inspections had been carried out as at 21 June on vessels identified as suspicious. Lebanese navy and customs officials inspected the vessels to verify that there were no unauthorized arms or related materiel on board and cleared all of them. During combined maritime interdiction operation exercises, Lebanese navy personnel demonstrated that the navy had gained the ability to conduct such operations and that significant progress had been made in controlling Lebanese territorial waters through the use of the coastal radars. However, Lebanese navy maritime operations remain restricted owing to the lack of an adequate number of vessels, including vessels that can operate in bad weather conditions.

26. Incidents along the line of buoys continued several times per week, with Israel Defense Forces navy units dropping depth charges and firing flares and warning shots along the buoy line. The Israel Defense Forces stated that these were security measures against Lebanese fishing vessels approaching the line of buoys. While UNIFIL has no mandate to monitor the line of buoys, which the Government of Israel installed unilaterally and which the Government of Lebanon does not recognize, the issue has been raised in the tripartite forum, and the Force Commander has expressed his concern that the incidents help to increase tension between the parties.

B. Security and liaison arrangements

27. Tripartite meetings, attended by senior representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the Israel Defense Forces and chaired by the Force Commander, remained a critical mechanism for regular liaison and coordination between UNIFIL and the parties, as well as for building confidence between the parties. Both parties relied on the tripartite forum as the principal mechanism for addressing security and military operational issues related to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

The reports on the investigation into the discovery of explosives south of Al Khiyam on 26 December 2009 and the 31 January 2010 incident involving a Lebanese shepherd were discussed at the meetings. The parties affirmed their commitment to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and the significance of the tripartite meetings in enhancing security and stability.

28. In late April, at a meeting held to consider all aspects of the joint technical review conducted by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNIFIL and actions that the Lebanese Armed Forces would take to complement those of UNIFIL, the senior commands of the two forces also held preliminary discussions concerning the development of a strategic dialogue mechanism. The objective of such dialogue would be to review regularly the correlation between the capacities and responsibilities of UNIFIL and those of the Lebanese Armed Forces, with a view to identifying Lebanese Armed Forces requirements for the accomplishment of tasks mandated in resolution 1701 (2006).

29. In addition, UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces continued their regular interaction at the operational and tactical levels. They maintained daily liaison at relevant levels, including through the placement of Lebanese Armed Forces liaison officers at UNIFIL headquarters and at the sector level, and the placement of a UNIFIL liaison officer at Lebanese Armed Forces headquarters for the South Litani Sector in Tyre.

30. UNIFIL and the Israel Defense Forces also maintained regular and efficient liaison and coordination. The UNIFIL Force Commander maintained effective relations with his Israel Defense Forces counterparts, and other senior Israeli authorities, and UNIFIL liaison officers continued to be co-located at the Israel Defense Forces Northern Command headquarters. No progress has been made in establishing a UNIFIL office in Tel Aviv.

C. Disarming armed groups

31. Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) calls for the full implementation of the relevant provisions of the Taif Accords, and of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1680 (2006), which require the disarmament of all armed groups in Lebanon, so that there will be no weapons or authority in Lebanon other than that of the Lebanese State. Hizbullah continues to maintain a substantial military capacity distinct from that of the Lebanese State, in violation of resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006). Detailed briefings on Hizbullah's alleged military capacity were recently provided by Israeli military authorities to representatives of the Lebanese Armed Forces and of the United Nations. In public pronouncements during the reporting period, Hizbullah's Secretary-General did not deny that Hizbullah had acquired new weapons, and he noted that it was prepared to respond to attacks by Israel against Lebanon. In a speech on 25 May, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon, Hizbullah's Secretary-General vowed to counter any attack from Israel with a proportional military response. He also stated that Hizbullah would respond to any Israeli maritime blockade of Lebanon by targeting ships bound for Israeli ports in the Mediterranean.

32. On 8 April, an armed clash between members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) in Qossaya, eastern Lebanon, resulted in at least one fatality. That incident highlighted once again the anomaly of

PFLP-GC and Fatah al-Intifada military bases in Lebanon and the threat that they pose to Lebanon's sovereignty. The military bases are beyond the control of the State and, with the exception of Naame, near Beirut, straddle the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, posing an added challenge to Lebanon's control of the border, which is of concern to me. I have called upon the Government of Lebanon to dismantle those bases and on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with these efforts. In that regard, I take note of the statement made on 3 March by the leader of Fatah al-Intifada, Abu Musa, that his organization's paramilitary bases could be relocated in coordination with the Lebanese authorities and that Palestinian weapons should be considered part of the discussion on Lebanon's national defence strategy in the National Dialogue. In fact, the National Dialogue decided in 2006 that Palestinian military groups outside the camps should be disarmed, and that decision was reaffirmed in the ministerial statement of November 2009. I believe it is time to make progress on that commitment.

33. It remains my firm conviction that the disarmament of Hizbullah and other militias should be achieved through a Lebanese-led political process. The political process has taken the form of the Lebanese National Dialogue. In accordance with the Doha Agreement of May 2008, the National Dialogue is chaired by the President and has on its agenda the adoption of a national defence strategy, which should, inter alia, address the issue of Hizbullah's arms. On 9 March, President Sleiman reconvened the National Dialogue for the first time since the parliamentary elections of June 2009. Under its new composition, the National Dialogue Committee has 19 participants in addition to the President, representing all major confessions and parties. The Committee held two additional meetings, on 15 April and 17 June.

34. At the meeting of the National Dialogue Committee held on 9 March, participants agreed to proceed with the discussion of a national defence strategy and to seek, through a committee of experts, to find commonalities among the proposals already presented by participants. The statement issued after the 15 April meeting reiterated the agreement among participants to continue discussions on the national defence strategy and encouraged participants to appoint representatives to the committee of experts. The meeting reaffirmed the commitment to agreements reached by the National Dialogue in 2006 and to work on their implementation. An additional meeting of the National Dialogue Committee was held on 17 June, at which the national defence strategy was discussed. It agreed to reconvene on 19 August.

35. Since its reconvening in May 2008, the National Dialogue has served to preserve domestic stability, in particular prior to the parliamentary elections of June 2009 and the municipal elections of May 2010. In compliance with the mandate given to the National Dialogue to arrive at a national defence strategy, a number of participants have presented their positions on this issue. To date, not all participants have nominated their members to the committee of experts, which does not seem to meet regularly. The decision taken by the National Dialogue in 2006 regarding the disarmament of Palestinian military groups outside the refugee camps and security inside the camps, which was included in the commitments undertaken by the Government in its ministerial statement of November 2009, has yet to be implemented. At recent meetings, a number of participants refused to allow the issue of Hizbullah's weapons to be broached, arguing that discussion in the National Dialogue should not serve to question the "resistance" but should, instead, focus on

reaching agreement on a national defence strategy. I encourage participants to remain focused on the development of a national defence strategy that will address the relationship between armed groups and the State, with a view to completing the disarmament of armed militias, as called for by resolutions 1559 (2004) and 1701 (2006).

D. Arms embargo

36. In resolution 1701 (2006), the Security Council called upon the Government of Lebanon to secure its borders and other entry points so as to prevent the entry of arms and related materiel without its consent. The Council also decided that all States were to prevent the sale or supply of arms and related material to entities or individuals in Lebanon by their nationals or from their territories using their flag vessels or aircraft. During the reporting period, the Government of Lebanon did not report any breach of the arms embargo imposed by resolution 1701 (2006).

37. On 13 April, the President of Israel, Shimon Peres, asserted that the Syrian Arab Republic had provided Scud missiles to Hizbullah, an allegation that was subsequently echoed by other senior Israeli officials. This was reiterated to my Special Coordinator during visits to Israel in late April and early June. Officials emphasized that the Scud missiles were only part of what they regarded as the vast arsenal that Hizbullah had accumulated. Concerns regarding the alleged transfer of sophisticated weapons to Hizbullah were also raised by officials from the United States of America. Lebanese and Syrian authorities have categorically denied that any transfer of such missiles took place. For his part, Hizbullah's Secretary-General stated publicly that he neither confirmed nor denied the acquisition by his party of such weaponry. The United Nations does not have the means to verify that information independently.

38. The allegations concerning the Scud missiles greatly increased tensions between Israel, Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic during the reporting period. Rhetoric escalated rapidly, creating the perception among the public that a resumption of conflict was imminent. At the time of the writing of the present report, tensions appeared to have subsided, owing mostly to the messages conveyed by Israeli and Syrian officials making clear that a confrontation was not desired and to the diplomatic actions undertaken by Prime Minister Hariri and several Arab and European Governments, as well as by the United States and the United Nations itself.

39. At the policy level, the Government of Lebanon remains committed to the development of a comprehensive strategy for the management of its borders, in line with the recommendations of the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team. Following the announcement by Prime Minister Hariri on 2 February of his commitment to adopting such a national border management strategy, on 3 March the Cabinet appointed a State Minister to oversee the strategy. An initial draft strategy, which was developed in consultation with various security agencies, has been prepared and awaits further examination before transmission to the Cabinet for approval. My Special Coordinator is in close contact with ambassadors from donor countries, which remain committed to supporting the Government's efforts to improve the management of its borders, including the implementation of the

strategy, once it has been made public. Donors would welcome early interaction at the technical level with the Government of Lebanon on this issue.

40. The deployment by Lebanon of security personnel for the effective management of its border with the Syrian Arab Republic remains unchanged. The Common Border Force, comprising some 700 personnel from four Lebanese security agencies (Armed Forces, Internal Security Forces, General Security and Customs), continued its operations along a stretch of 90 km of the northern border. On the eastern border, which has a total length of 210 km, the Lebanese Armed Forces continues to deploy approximately 500 troops and the Internal Security Forces some 200 personnel on a stretch of 80 km immediately adjacent to the area of operations of the existing Common Border Force, with a view to integrating them in a Common Border Force II, which will come into existence once the other two security agencies have assigned personnel to it and the necessary material conditions have been met. The Government expects the support of the international community in order to render the Common Border Force II operational.

41. Inevitably, the effective management of Lebanon's borders continues to be affected by the fact that the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic has not been delineated and by the continued presence of Palestinian military bases which straddle the border between the two countries. Furthermore, the overall management of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic is dependent on the extent to which there is actual cooperation on border management between security agencies from the two countries. I have called upon the Government of Lebanon to dismantle the bases and on the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic to cooperate with such efforts. According to Lebanese officials, this cooperation is still nascent and requires further development. I am confident that progress will be made in this respect in coming months.

E. Landmines and cluster bombs

42. The Lebanese Mine Action Centre continues to coordinate humanitarian clearance operations in southern Lebanon through the Regional Mine Action Centre in Nabatiye. The United Nations Mine Action Coordination Centre continues to liaise between UNIFIL and the Regional Centre in respect of operations, accreditation and quality assurance. During the reporting period, four new cluster-bomb strike locations were identified and recorded, bringing to 1,121 the total number of locations to date.

43. During the reporting period, seven incidents involving unexploded ordnance from the 2006 conflict occurred, resulting in injury to six civilians and one deminer. The incidents bring the total number of fatalities and injuries among civilians since the end of the conflict to 30 and 252, respectively, and among demining personnel resulting from clearance activities since August 2006 to 60, with 14 fatalities and 46 injuries.

F. Delineation of borders

44. While the delineation and demarcation of the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic is a bilateral issue, the Security Council, in paragraph 4 of its resolution 1680 (2006), strongly encouraged the Government of the Syrian Arab

Republic to respond positively to the request by the Government of Lebanon to delineate their common border, especially in those areas where the border is uncertain or disputed, as this would constitute a significant step towards improved management of the border, guaranteeing Lebanon's sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence and improving relations between the two countries. In resolution 1701 (2006), the Council reiterated that call.

45. At their meeting on 14 August 2008, Presidents Al-Assad and Sleiman decided to reactivate the Lebanese-Syrian border committee, which is tasked with delineating and delimiting the border. Since the Government of Lebanon communicated to the Government of the Syrian Arab Republic the names of its representatives on the committee, the Lebanese delegation has held a number of preparatory meetings, but a meeting of the full committee with Syrian counterparts has not yet been held. On 15 June, Presidents Sleiman and Al-Assad held a meeting in Damascus during which they agreed to initiate the process of border delineation and demarcation as soon as possible.

46. No progress was recorded on the issue of the Shab'a farms area. In spite of my repeated requests, I have not received any response from Israel, which continues to occupy the area, or from the Syrian Arab Republic to the provisional definition of the area contained in my report on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) issued on 30 October 2007 (S/2007/641). Syrian officials have continued to affirm their recognition that the Shab'a farms area is Lebanese, but insist on Israel's withdrawal from the area before delineation can occur.

III. Security and safety of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

47. The safety and security of UNIFIL staff remains a priority. Notwithstanding the obligation of all parties to ensure the safety and security of the Force and the responsibility of the Government of Lebanon for maintaining law and order, UNIFIL continued to apply risk-mitigating measures for its personnel, assets and installations while ensuring mandate implementation. The Force continued to receive security threats during the reporting period. On 23 April, a small quantity (approximately 150 g) of explosives was detected in a civilian vehicle parked outside the UNIFIL Sector East headquarters. UNIFIL and the Lebanese authorities and the Lebanese Armed Forces continued their cooperation and joint efforts to ensure that security threats to UNIFIL are addressed appropriately.

48. UNIFIL continued to monitor cases in the Lebanese military court against individuals or groups accused of being involved in planning or attempting to carry out attacks against UNIFIL. One case, against 13 Palestinian defendants who had been accused of, inter alia, forming an armed group, monitoring and attacking the Lebanese Armed Forces and monitoring UNIFIL with intent to attack with explosive devices and weapons, was concluded. The judge sentenced 12 of the 13 defendants — 9 of whom remain at large and were tried in absentia — to prison terms with hard labour and acquitted the other. The judge also sentenced 13 defendants, 11 of whom remain at large and were tried in absentia, and acquitted 1 in a case involving a failed roadside bomb attack on UNIFIL personnel in Tyre in July 2007. A second, related case is ongoing. Court proceedings also began against a group of Palestinians accused of enlisting in an armed terror cell with the objective of, inter

alia, monitoring UNIFIL and carrying out terrorist acts by planting and detonating explosive devices.

49. In the attacks on UNIFIL personnel carried out in July 2007 and January 2008, there are no developments to report in respect of those individuals who have been convicted and sentenced for the attacks but remain at large. Spanish and Lebanese authorities continue their respective investigations, in close cooperation, into the attack on UNIFIL on 24 June 2007, in which six peacekeepers serving with the Spanish contingent were killed. The Spanish investigative judge requested additional information from the Lebanese judicial authorities.

IV. Deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon

50. As at 15 June 2010, the total military strength of UNIFIL was 11,769, of whom 477 were women. The mission has 317 international and 655 national civilian staff members, of whom 84 and 165, respectively, are women. UNIFIL is also supported by 53 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization military observers of the Observer Group Lebanon, none of whom are women. The Nepalese company of 150 personnel arrived in May 2010, as expected, while the armoured personnel carriers were still due to arrive. A Sri Lankan force protection company and a Cambodian demining company are scheduled to join UNIFIL in August. UNIFIL is in the process of implementing the recommendations of the joint technical review conducted by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNIFIL, including the recommended adjustments to the force structure, assets and requirements. In accordance with resolution 1325 (2000) on women and peace and security, a UNIFIL Gender Unit has been established and a mission-wide gender task force of military and civilian personnel has been initiated.

51. In accordance with the decision of the General Assembly in its resolution 62/265, the Strategic Military Cell will terminate its functions effective 30 June, at which time they will be fully integrated within the reinforced Office of Military Affairs of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (see S/2008/425 para. 58).

52. Italy maintained the leadership of the Maritime Task Force throughout the period. At the time of writing, it was not possible to identify a lead nation for the Maritime Task Force to succeed Italy when its leadership comes to an end on 30 June. Therefore, the Maritime Task Force will temporarily have to carry out its tasks under an onshore command until a lead nation comes forward. UNIFIL and the Department of Peacekeeping Operations have developed a contingency plan in that regard and are putting in place the additional staff and communications requirements for an onshore command arrangement so as to ensure that the Maritime Task Force, as an interim measure, can continue to implement its mandate in a safe and effective manner. Early in May, one frigate and one patrol boat from Bangladesh joined the Maritime Task Force, bringing the total strength to eight vessels, with a composition of two frigates, three corvettes, two fast patrol boats and one supply vessel, complemented by one helicopter.

V. Observations

53. The continued respect of the cessation of hostilities and the Blue Line by Israel and Lebanon is the best guarantee that relative calm will continue to prevail in the area. Yet the situation remains fragile. More work remains to be done by the parties to advance the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and to take the steps recommended in previous reports and reiterated in the present report. It is the responsibility of the parties to focus on all outstanding issues in order to reach a permanent ceasefire and a long-term solution, as envisaged in resolution 1701 (2006). At the moment, they are not doing enough in this regard.

54. The new strategic environment and the relative stability prevailing in southern Lebanon that UNIFIL has helped to establish, in cooperation with the Lebanese Armed Forces, offer a window of opportunity for the parties to make progress on their obligations. As I have stated in previous reports, the opportunity that the UNIFIL presence has created and the existing financial and troop commitments cannot be maintained indefinitely. I have asked my Special Coordinator to engage the parties in a process towards achieving a permanent ceasefire, in close coordination with the UNIFIL Force Commander. I urge the parties to seize the opportunity to make tangible progress in this respect in the coming months.

55. Israel must withdraw its forces from northern Ghajar and an adjacent area north of the Blue Line, in accordance with resolution 1701 (2006). I urge the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from the area without further delay. UNIFIL continues to stand ready to facilitate such a withdrawal.

56. I am concerned about the fact that the Israel Defense Forces continue to violate resolution 1701 (2006) and Lebanese sovereignty on an almost daily basis through overflights of Lebanese territory. These overflights create a tense situation and have the potential to trigger an incident that could rapidly escalate. They run counter to UNIFIL objectives and efforts to reduce tensions, and have a negative impact on the credibility of the Lebanese Armed Forces and UNIFIL. I call once again on Israel to respect Lebanon's sovereignty by ceasing immediately all overflights of Lebanese territory.

57. I am also concerned about the ground violations of the Blue Line that have occurred in recent months. The inherent risk of escalating the security situation that these incidents carry cannot be overstated. I wish to recall that the identification of the Blue Line in 2000 was solely the responsibility of the United Nations for the practical purpose of confirming the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from Lebanon in compliance with resolution 425 (1978), without prejudice to future border agreements. Both sides, despite their respective reservations in 2000 about the Blue Line, undertook to respect the Line in its entirety as identified by the United Nations. I therefore call on both parties to do their utmost to prevent violations of the Blue Line, to act with maximum restraint and to refrain from taking any measures close to the Blue Line that could lead to misunderstandings or be perceived by the other side as provocative. In particular, the Government of Lebanon must prevent violations of and respect the Blue Line in its entirety.

58. Increased support for the Lebanese Armed Forces remains critical. The Lebanese Armed Forces, in partnership with UNIFIL, play a key role in the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). They have continued to act with strong

commitment and resolve, and their capacity has been gradually strengthened with the assistance of international donors. I am grateful to those countries that are helping to equip and train the Lebanese Armed Forces, including the navy, and I urge the international community to continue this critically required support to Lebanese Armed Forces capacity-building. Such support is essential if the Lebanese Armed Forces are to be able to assume effective responsibility for security over the area of UNIFIL operations and the maritime entry points into Lebanon in the future. I welcome the endorsement by the Lebanese authorities of the recommendation of the joint technical review conducted by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UNIFIL (see S/2010/86) for the formalization of a regular strategic dialogue mechanism between UNIFIL and the Lebanese Armed Forces, and I call on the Lebanese Government to take the decisions that will enable the process to commence as soon as possible.

59. I am concerned about the incidents during the reporting period that impeded the freedom of movement of UNIFIL and call on the Lebanese Armed Forces to ensure that UNIFIL is accorded full freedom of movement within its area of operations. Some of the restrictions on movement can be explained by the inconvenience caused by the presence of a military force in a civilian environment. Other restrictions, however, when seen together with the continued monitoring of UNIFIL by civilians, cannot but cast doubt on the motives of those involved.

60. I am grateful to all troop-contributing countries for their continued commitment to UNIFIL and to the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006). The need for such continued commitment and support, including the contribution of the troops and assets necessary to enable UNIFIL to efficiently and effectively perform all of its mandated activities on land and at sea, cannot be overstated. I wish to acknowledge the work of the Strategic Military Cell in having provided dedicated military support to UNIFIL since its establishment in 2006, and I have full confidence that the Office of Military Affairs of the Department of Peacekeeping Operations will continue to perform its functions after the termination of the Strategic Military Cell on 30 June. I also wish to commend the UNIFIL Force Commander and the military and civilian peacekeeping personnel who continue to play a critical role in helping to promote peace and stability in southern Lebanon, as well as the Special Coordinator for Lebanon and the staff of his Office.

61. I continue to believe that the functioning of the national unity Government in Lebanon provides a unique opportunity to take the measures outlined in the ministerial statement of November 2009 that would result in a strengthening of the Lebanese State. The search for consensus within the Government is critical to the maintenance of domestic stability in Lebanon. At the same time, this should not detract from the full implementation of obligations under resolution 1701 (2006) and other relevant resolutions, which remain the best guarantee for continued stability between Lebanon and Israel and for their progress towards peaceful, long-term arrangements to govern their relations.

62. I call on the friends and neighbours of Lebanon to do their utmost to support the strengthening of the State and the full implementation of Security Council resolutions. In particular, I welcome the marked improvement in the relations between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic. I hope that this improvement will translate into progress on those bilateral issues that have a bearing on the implementation of resolution 1701 (2006).

63. The allegations by Israeli authorities regarding the transfer of Scud missiles from the Syrian Arab Republic to Hizbullah resulted in increased tension in the region in late April and early May. That tension once again illustrated the importance of control by Lebanon over its borders and of respect by all Member States for the prohibition against the transfer of arms and related materiel to entities or individuals in Lebanon without the consent of the Lebanese State, which are key elements of resolution 1701 (2006). I continue to be encouraged by the commitment of Prime Minister Hariri to developing a comprehensive border strategy for Lebanon, as called for by the Lebanon Independent Border Assessment Team, and reiterate the offer of assistance by the United Nations in this respect. I am grateful to Member States that are providing assistance in order to increase Lebanon's border-management capacity and call upon the international community to support future implementation of the country's comprehensive border strategy.

64. I welcome the commitment of the Presidents of Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic to delineating the common border between their countries and look forward to concrete steps being taken in this respect during the coming reporting period. I also intend to continue my diplomatic efforts aimed at resolving the issue of the Shab'a farms area. I call once again upon Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to submit their responses to the provisional definition of the Shab'a farms area that I have provided on the basis of the best available information.

65. The United Nations regularly receives reports and specific allegations that Hizbullah maintains a vast arsenal and a significant military capacity. The United Nations does not have the means to verify this information independently. The presence of armed groups in Lebanon operating beyond the control of the State remains a matter of serious concern to me, as they challenge the ability of the State to exercise its full sovereignty and control over its territory. I continue to believe that the disarmament of armed groups should be carried out through a Lebanese-led political process that would result in bringing all arms under the control of the State. In this respect, I welcome the reconvening by President Sleiman of the National Dialogue Committee, which is mandated to formulate a national defence strategy. I encourage participants to establish a credible process for this endeavour and to adopt benchmarks against which progress could be assessed.

66. I call upon the Government of Lebanon to implement past decisions taken by the National Dialogue with respect to the elimination of Palestinian military bases, some of which straddle the border between Lebanon and the Syrian Arab Republic, and to address the issue of arms inside the official refugee camps, in compliance with its ministerial statement. Officials from the Syrian Arab Republic have stated that their Government is ready to support the efforts of the Government of Lebanon to achieve this goal, provided they receive a request from the Government of Lebanon in this respect.

67. The situation of Palestinian refugees living in Lebanon remains a subject of grave concern. I believe that more efforts need to be made to improve their living conditions, while ensuring the peaceful coexistence of the Lebanese and Palestinian communities and without prejudice to the settlement of the Palestinian refugee question in the context of a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement. I am concerned about serious shortfalls being faced by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) in funding for its regular programmes, aimed at delivering basic services to the Palestinian refugees,

and for the reconstruction of the Nahr al-Bared camp, which was destroyed in 2007. I therefore call upon the Government of Lebanon and the donor community to make a concerted effort to address the dire socio-economic situation of the Palestinian refugee community as a matter of priority. I urge the international donor community, including regional countries, to continue and, wherever possible, increase their support for UNRWA activities.

68. While resolution 1701 (2006) is concerned primarily with the situation between Lebanon and Israel, I remain keenly aware that this situation is greatly influenced by dynamics affecting the region as a whole. In particular, the implementation by both parties of their obligations under the resolution takes place in a particular regional context that can either facilitate or render more difficult the actions required for implementation. Tangible progress on the Middle East peace process would have a positive impact on the full implementation of resolution 1701 (2006) and on the stability of Lebanon.

69. I call on both parties to take the steps necessary to achieve what Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) terms a long-term solution that would govern their relations. The achievement of that solution cannot and should not be dissociated from the need to achieve a comprehensive, just and lasting peace in the Middle East, based on all relevant resolutions of the Security Council, including resolutions 242 (1967), 338 (1973) and 1515 (2003). I call upon the parties and upon all Member States to work decisively towards this goal.

United Nations S/2010/353

Security Council

Distr.: General
1 July 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 21 June 2010 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to convey the attached communication dated 2 June 2010, which I have received from the Deputy Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Claudio Bisogniero, transmitting the quarterly report on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan covering the period from 1 November 2009 to 31 January 2010 (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would bring the present letter and its annex to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

10-43475 (E) 150710

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Annex

Letter dated 2 June 2010 from the Deputy Secretary-General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization addressed to the Secretary-General

In accordance with Security Council resolutions 1386 (2001) and 1510 (2003), I hereby attach a report on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force covering the period from November 2009 to January 2010. I would appreciate your making the report available to the Security Council (see enclosure).

(*Signed*) Claudio **Bisogniero**

Enclosure

Quarterly report to the Security Council on the operations of the International Security Assistance Force

Introduction

1. The present report, pursuant to the obligation under Security Council resolution 1890 (2009) to report to the United Nations on the progress of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) mission, covers the period from 1 November 2009 to 31 January 2010. As at 1 February 2010, total International Security Assistance Force strength stood at 87,646 personnel, from 28 NATO nations and 15 non-NATO nations.

2. Throughout the reporting period, ISAF has continued to assist the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan in accordance with relevant Security Council resolutions. From 1 November 2009 to 31 January 2010, ISAF suffered 794 casualties, including 89 killed in action, 696 wounded in action and 9 non-battle-related deaths. Key issues have been:

(a) Based on relevant decisions of the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board, on 28 January 2010, the London Conference on Afghanistan agreed on targets for significant increases in the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police supported by the international community: 171,000 Afghan National Army and 134,000 Afghan National Police by the end of 2011, taking total security force numbers to over 300,000;

(b) Also at the London Conference, the international community and the Government of Afghanistan welcomed the NATO decision to develop a plan for phased transition to Afghan security leadership, province by province, possibly beginning at the end of 2010 or early 2011. It was agreed that the transition to Afghan National Security Forces lead must not be premature but must be conditions-based, and that as conditions were met, ISAF would move to a supporting role in those provinces. Transition is in itself a process and does not signify withdrawal;

(c) The unremitting efforts of ISAF, based on effective implementation of the new approach of the Commander ISAF, General McChrystal, to reduce civilian casualties and collateral damage, continue to show positive results. Civilian casualties caused by anti-Government forces continue to climb (chiefly as a result of improvised explosive devices). In its efforts, ISAF continues to reduce civilian casualties as well as damage to infrastructure and property.

Security situation

3. The insurgents in Afghanistan remain a resilient force, adapting their methods in relation to the increased capacity and capability of ISAF/Afghan National Security Forces. The insurgents typically avoid direct confrontations with large contingents of ISAF and Afghan National Security Forces in order to preserve combat power and continue to intimidate the local population. This is evidenced by the significant increase in improvised explosive device events as compared to the past year. Additionally, insurgents have continued to conduct a low, but relatively steady, number of high visibility attacks in urban areas and Highway 1, with the

focus on Kabul City due to the media impact that can be achieved there. The output of such incidents has continued to result in numbers of innocent civilian casualties caused by the insurgents, while the Afghan National Security Forces have demonstrated an increasing capability to counter such attacks. Overall, these high visibility attacks continue to clearly demonstrate the willingness among the insurgents to conduct attacks with no regard to civilian, domestic or foreign lives. According to public reports, the insurgents are concerned about their losses in Pakistan and Afghanistan, which place a strain on their leadership and cause more frequent reliance upon activity requiring less manpower and cooperation among their groups.

4. The threat remains decentralized, with several insurgent groups, dominated by the Taliban, and a similar set of goals: withdrawal of international forces, removal of the Government of Afghanistan and establishment of a fundamentalist, authoritarian and theocratic regime. Regionally, the security situation is as follows:

(a) *Regional Command Capital*. The insurgents continue to target Regional Command Capital as a high-value/high-pay-off target area, exploiting the media and the international presence to support propaganda efforts. Although there was a spike in activity during the electoral process in August, the insurgent activity level for 2009 was below that in 2008, and the November/December 2009 numbers were equal to or lower than the November/December 2008 numbers. While the January attack in Kabul received a great deal of media attention, with some characterizing it as Taliban "resilience", one should bear in mind that the event was conducted by seven insurgents and was effectively contained by the Afghan National Security Forces. The overall threat level is expected to remain high in the coming months, with the associated potential for improvised explosive device and other deadly attacks remaining significant;

(b) *Regional Command North*. Despite a rise in insurgent activity, security in Regional Command North remained relatively stable compared to other regions. Violence is linked rather to criminal activity, drugs and corruption and is still the most important security concern. In recent months, Regional Command North has seen isolated, coordinated insurgent activity, provoked by key activists and facilitated by external financial and logistics support, emanating mainly from secluded areas. Outside of these areas, local dynamics allow the population to resist the insurgency, even where there is minimal ISAF or Afghan National Security Forces presence;

(c) *Regional Command West*. There has been an increase of insurgents activity in the past few months. Ethnic tensions, powerbrokers, criminality and smuggling activities add to the volatility of the region. Outside of Herat, the rule of the Government remains weak and order is generally enforced by local powerbrokers. As coalition forces focus their efforts in areas of Regional Command South, pressure on insurgents lines of communication and safe havens in the West has risen;

(d) *Regional Command South*. Regional Command South remains the focal point for Taliban operations, with a continued focus on Helmand and Kandahar Provinces, with the insurgents, including foreign fighters, attempting to expand their influence in the urban areas. An increase of combined Afghan National Security Forces/ISAF operations and presence has threatened the safe havens of the insurgents and disrupted their supply lines and freedom of movement. In some

areas, the high threat level is hampering reconstruction and development projects. The reporting period saw the planning of a major operation in Regional Command South, Operation Moshtarak, which aims to tackle insurgent strongholds in Helmand Province in order to reduce their freedom of movement and to restore the governance of the Government of Afghanistan throughout this region;

(e) *Regional Command East*. The insurgency in Regional Command East is considered to be splintered, with different insurgent groups operating in separate areas. The area also experienced an increase in kinetic events, including direct and indirect fire, as well as improvised explosive device emplacements along the main supply routes. The insurgents are able to target bases and supply routes along the border and inhospitable terrain in the mountainous areas.

5. Improvised explosive device attacks continue to cause the majority of casualties among ISAF, Afghan National Security Forces and Afghan civilians. The use of improvised explosive devices by insurgents rose 87 per cent over the same period last year and has contributed to significant civilian casualties. However, the number of discoveries remains higher than detonations, representing during the same time frame 58 per cent of all improvised explosive device events.

Afghan National Army

6. The Afghan National Security Forces as a whole is assessed to be smaller than required to cope with the demands of fighting the insurgents. The need to increase the size and capability of the Afghan National Army is a vital part of this strategy. The London Conference reached an agreement to increase the Afghan National Army end strength at a faster rate than had been previously approved. Current enlistment success offers encouragement that the new milestones can be reached, but critical training resources must also be provided to enable this. Shortfalls remain in both institutional trainers and in operational mentor and liaison teams.

Afghan National Police

7. The Afghan National Police continues to lag behind the Afghan National Army in terms of its development. Late 2009 assessments of the Afghan National Police operational status indicate that the Afghan National Police is weaker than anticipated, both in the quality of some of those serving and in the operational capacity of some of its core bodies. Following his own 30-day initial assessment, the Commander of the new NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan ordered a thorough, urgent review of all Afghan National Police activities. The ongoing review is examining the Afghan National Police/Afghan National Army relationship, the capacity of the Ministry of the Interior, recruiting and retention, corruption, leadership capacity, training, partnering and logistics. The responsibility of the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan for assisting in developing both the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police will allow a more holistic approach to assisting the Afghan National Security Forces. However, substantial NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan staffing shortfalls must be addressed to fully realize the advantages of the new organizational structures. With regard to total force strength, the recently endorsed target of 134,000 personnel is likely to be met; however, ultimate success is dependent on the commitment of the international community in resourcing the training, partnering and mentoring functions. The Afghans themselves must reduce the Afghan National Police attrition rate while attracting the

right number of good recruits. During the reporting period, greater in-theatre coordination at the staff level has taken place with the European Union Police Mission in Afghanistan and other international presences through the Police Coordination Board regarding the training of the Afghan National Police.

Afghan National Army Air Corps

8. The Afghan National Army Air Corps is supported by the NATO Training Mission-Afghanistan and continues to grow slowly while increasing its capabilities. In November, the Afghan National Army Air Corps received the first 3 of an anticipated 18 C-27s, which will become the backbone of the Afghan transport capability. Moreover, there has been a significant increase in the helicopter fleet, providing much greater flexibility for medical evacuations (MEDEVAC) and other battlefield mobility missions, while simultaneously enabling the Afghan National Security Forces to commence joint operations.

Counter-narcotics

9. The Government of Afghanistan recognizes Afghanistan's responsibility to engage the illicit narcotics industry and its links to the insurgency, crime and corruption. The eight pillars of the Afghan National Drug Control Strategy target areas identified as having potentially the most sustainable impact on the drug trade. The current priorities of the Strategy focus on strengthening legal rural livelihoods, disrupting the networks and linkages between the insurgency and criminal entities, reducing demand for illicit drugs as well as continuing to develop State institutions. In order to carry out these objectives, the Strategy promotes a comprehensive approach to counter-narcotics: building institutions, alternative livelihoods, interdiction and law enforcement, information campaigns, criminal justice, demand reduction and regional cooperation. The ultimate aim of the Strategy is to ensure a sustainable decrease in cultivation, production, trafficking and consumption of illicit drugs, with a view to complete and lasting elimination of these illicit narcotics.

10. ISAF continues to focus on cross-agency coordination while simultaneously enhancing operational support to the counter-narcotics efforts of the Government of Afghanistan. Provincial reconstruction teams have continued to work towards providing guidance for provincial planners, which has contributed to the promotion of alternative livelihood programmes and has been reinforced by information operations. ISAF has liaised closely with and supported governor-led eradication campaigns to enable their maximum effectiveness. While not directly engaged in operations against cultivation, ISAF has provided logistical and intelligence support to Afghan forces, operating within the current counter-narcotics mandate and resources. With the establishment of the ISAF Joint Command, coordination of ISAF support to counter-narcotics operations by Government forces, including the Combined Joint Inter-Agency Task Force and the Interagency Operations Coordination Centre, has been simplified. The recent delegation of authority to support such operations, from the Commander ISAF to the Commander Intermediate Joint Command should further streamline this process.

Governance

11. During the reporting period, NATO and ISAF were involved in preparations for the London Conference of 28 January 2010, in coordination with the

Government of Afghanistan via the Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board and the international community. It was especially conducive to the increasing civil-military integration that there was growing consensus between ISAF and the leadership of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan on the way forward in Afghanistan, an issue recognized as vital for the success of the ISAF mission by both NATO and the United Nations.

12. ISAF rendered support at all levels to the Government of Afghanistan, including through the provincial reconstruction teams, encouraging the central government to engage with the provincial and district levels, supporting governors in projecting their authority, and facilitating local government to function. In addition to one existing civilian provincial reconstruction team in Wardak, many provincial reconstruction teams have already substantially increased their civilian component, with several teams currently functioning at a 50/50 civilian to military basis.

13. The lack of institutionalized rule of law, the level of corruption, the absence of a proper prison system and the existence of a nexus between crime and insurgency all continue to impact on the measure of security ISAF can deliver in its supporting role. However, progress is expected on all of these vital elements in 2010 following the consensus achieved at the London Conference.

14. ISAF has been working in close cooperation with Government ministries to assist in the development of the handling of trade in and out of Afghanistan at the border crossing points. Special border coordination centres have been set up in partnership with donor nations and the Government to improve the facilities at commercial border crossing points in order to assist in revenue collection and the administration of customs processes.

Civilian casualties

15. One of the most important issues facing the ISAF mission is the necessity to minimize civilian casualties. Along with Afghan National Security Forces partners, ISAF has maintained a continuous effort at reducing civilian casualties and collateral damage, and every effort will be made to continue this trend. This ongoing endeavour is of critical importance as troop levels continue to increase in 2010. Specifically, the implementation of the tactical directive of the Commander ISAF regarding civilian casualties has resulted in a marked reduction in the proportion of civilian casualty incidences attributable to Afghan National Security Forces/ISAF, while the vast majority of civilian casualties are caused by anti-Government forces. Meanwhile, ISAF continues efforts to improve communication and enhance transparency and accountability and the Commander ISAF continues to stress the importance of preventing civilian casualties and damage to infrastructure and property.

United Nations S/2010/354

Security Council

Distr.: General
29 June 2010

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General concerning the credentials of the alternate representative of Uganda on the Security Council

Pursuant to rule 15 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, the Secretary-General wishes to report that he has received credentials from the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Uganda, signed on 23 February 2010, stating that Mr. David Etuket has been appointed alternate representative of Uganda on the Security Council.

In the opinion of the Secretary-General, these credentials are in order.

10-43947 (E) 080710

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United Nations S/2010/355

Security Council

Distr.: General
2 July 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 2 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Serbia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Upon the instruction of my Government, I have the honour to request an urgent meeting of the Security Council for Monday, 5 July 2010, devoted to the serious deterioration of the security situation in the northern part of Kosovo, which has already resulted in the loss of human life and threatens to provoke further violence.

I also have the honour to request that, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and rule 37 of the provisional rules of procedure of the Security Council, Boris Tadic, President of the Republic of Serbia, be allowed to participate in the meeting and to make a statement.

I would be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Feodor **Starcevic**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

10-43617 (E) 020710

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United Nations A/ES-10/495–S/2010/356

General Assembly
Security Council

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6 July 2010

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General Assembly
Tenth emergency special session
Agenda item 5
Illegal Israeli actions in Occupied East Jerusalem and the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Identical letters dated 2 July 2010 from the Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

We are writing today to express our grave concern over and objection to the escalating illegal practices by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, especially in Occupied East Jerusalem. Since our last letter, the occupying Power has intensified its illegal campaign against Occupied East Jerusalem, issuing additional home-demolition orders and revoking the residency rights of Palestinian Jerusalemites, including elected Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) representatives.

Most recently, the Minister of Defence of Israel renewed an illegal order banning the head of the Islamic Higher Council in Jerusalem, Dr. Ikrima Sabri, from entering Al-Aqsa Compound for an additional six months. This unjustified decision comes as Israeli authorities are intensifying their campaign against notable Palestinian leaders in Jerusalem and as rights organizations reveal that Israeli Government institutions, including the Ministry of the Interior, are intensifying their efforts to renew home demolitions in the Occupied City on a massive scale. In fact, recent information indicates that the Israeli authorities intend to carry out 200 impending demolition orders against approximately 1,000 Palestinian homes in Occupied East Jerusalem. This planned campaign of massive destruction would affect thousands of Palestinians and render them homeless.

Despite its blatant illegality, Israeli occupation authorities are also pressing ahead with the revocation of residency rights for hundreds of Palestinian Jerusalemites, including most recently that of PLC member Mr. Mohammad Abu Tair, who now awaits trial and possible deportation on Sunday. Identification revocation is a serious measure, as it displaces and separates families as well as contributes directly and enormously to the occupying Power's blatant campaign to empty the Occupied City of its original Palestinian inhabitants. In this regard, we would like to stress our rejection of this illegal measure and reiterate that no matter how massive, this criminal ethnic cleansing campaign shall have no bearing on the

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final status of the City, which shall remain the eternal capital of Palestine, in line with international law and the relevant General Assembly and Security Council resolutions.

While Occupied East Jerusalem is bearing the brunt of the current illegal and aggressive actions by Israel, the occupying Power, the rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory also continues to suffer from the occupation's punitive measures. The Save the Children organization has just revealed that Palestinian children in the Occupied West Bank, particularly those living in Area C, suffer more hunger and malnutrition than children in the war-ravaged and siege-stricken Gaza Strip owing to Israel's continuing campaign of home demolitions, illegal settlement expansion and movement restrictions. On Thursday, 1 July 2010, the Israeli occupation authorities added several families to the list of new victims when bulldozers demolished 13 homes and dozens of shacks in the Jordan Valley.

The Gaza Strip also continues to suffer from the devastating effects of the inhumane and illegal Israeli blockade. The occupying Power has yet to release a list of the civilian goods it will allow into the Strip. In fact, the occupation authorities have once again cynically exploited media attention by announcing the entry of items such as ketchup and condiments while remaining silent on why critically needed medical equipment and building materials remain barred from entering Gaza despite promises to the contrary.

These measures, which continue unabated despite the international outcry, constitute a stark reflection of the true intentions and agenda of the current Israeli Government, which continues to adopt intransigent positions in the ongoing proximity talks. The international community is at a cross point now. It must exhibit the necessary moral leadership to confront these measures and ensure that they cease immediately. The two-State solution, which is the common international goal and undisputed requisite for peace in the Middle East, has never been more threatened. The actions of Israel, the occupying Power, are rendering this international necessity for peace devoid of meaning and viability. Hence, the international community, represented by the United Nations, must take clear action to ensure that the path of walls, settlements, war crimes and belligerence is promptly and swiftly replaced by concerted action for peace, the path to which is shorter, clearer and far more valuable than the current irresponsible procrastination and falsehoods in which Israel is currently engaged.

Finally, allow me to reassure you that the Palestinian leadership is determined to continue on its path of State-building and peace, despite the obstacles and the aggression meted out to it by the occupying Power. The Palestinians are determined to remain in full partnership with the international community in our respect for international law and the efforts to implement the relevant United Nations resolutions in order to protect international peace and security by resolving this conflict and establishing an independent, viable and contiguous Palestinian State, with East Jerusalem as its capital.

This letter is in follow-up to our previous 370 letters regarding the ongoing crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, since 28 September 2000. These letters, dated from 29 September 2000 (A/55/432-S/2000/921) to 16 June 2010 (A/ES-10/491-S/2010/317), constitute a basic record of the crimes committed by Israel, the occupying Power, against the Palestinian people since September 2000. For all of these war crimes, acts of State terrorism

and systematic human rights violations committed against the Palestinian people, Israel, the occupying Power, must be held accountable, and the perpetrators must be brought to justice.

I should be grateful if you would arrange to have the text of the present letter distributed as a document of the tenth emergency special session of the General Assembly, under agenda item 5, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Dr. Riyad **Mansour**
Ambassador
Permanent Observer of Palestine to the United Nations

United Nations S/2010/357

Security Council

Distr.: General
6 July 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 1 July 2010 from the Secretary-General addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to refer to Security Council resolution 1916 (2010), adopted by the Council on 19 March 2010. In paragraph 6, the Council requested the Secretary-General to re-establish the Monitoring Group for a period of 12 months, drawing, as appropriate, on the expertise of the members of the Monitoring Group established pursuant to resolution 1853 (2008), and consistent with resolution 1907 (2009), with the addition of three experts, in order to fulfil its expanded mandate.

Accordingly, I wish to inform you that, after consulting with the Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 751 (1992) and 1907 (2009) concerning Somalia and Eritrea, I have appointed the following experts:

Somalia

Mr. Jörg Roofthooft (Belgium, transport/maritime expert)
Mr. Babatunde Abayomi Taiwo (Nigeria, arms expert)
Ms. Carolina Reyes (Colombia, humanitarian expert)

Eritrea

Mr. Ghassan Schbley (United States of America, finance expert)
Mr. Jan Hendrik Van Zyl (South Africa, transport/aviation expert)

I have also designated Mr. Matt Bryden (Canada, regional expert) to serve as Coordinator of the Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea.

I shall appoint in due course a finance expert for the Somalia component of the Monitoring Group and an arms expert for the Eritrea component.

I should be grateful if you would bring this matter to the attention of the members of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **BAN** Ki-moon

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United Nations S/2010/358

Security Council

Distr.: General
6 July 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 6 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the answer given by the spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the question put by the Korean Central News Agency on 6 July 2010 with regard to the United States argument that the "Cheonan" incident be discussed at the "Military Armistice Commission" (MAC) (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) **Sin** Son Ho
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

10-43798 (E) 060710

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Annex to the letter dated 6 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Answer by the spokesman of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to the question put by the Korean Central News Agency on 6 July 2010 with regard to the United States argument that the "Cheonan" incident be discussed at the "Military Armistice Commission"

The United States has placed the south Korean authorities at the head in its persistent demand that the "Cheonan" incident be discussed at the "Military Armistice Commission" (MAC), alleging that this incident constitutes a "violation of the Korean Armistice Agreement".

It is a historical fact known to the world that the Korean Armistice Agreement, from the moment of its signature, became subject to systematic violation and abrogation by the United States.

The United States has systematically abrogated essential elements of the Korean Armistice Agreement; it violated paragraph 60 of the Armistice Agreement stipulating that a political conference of a higher level be held to settle through negotiation the questions of the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea and the peaceful settlement of the Korean question. It also went on to violate paragraph 13 of the Armistice Agreement banning the introduction of equipment for military operations from outside of Korea.

In 1991, the United States made the unilateral decision to designate an army "general" of south Korea, which is neither party to the Armistice Agreement nor a member of the "United Nations Command", as the senior member of the "United Nations Command" side to "MAC" and eluded its responsibility from that seat, thus completely paralysing MAC.

The United States has already destroyed by itself the Armistice Agreement and its mechanism. It does not stand to reason that the United States is now trying to take them into the "Cheonan" incident.

Herein lies an ulterior aim sought by the United States.

As time goes by, growing suspicion about the "results of investigation" announced by the south Korean authorities continues to spread across the world, whereas the international community is expressing greater sympathy with our proposal to send an inspection team.

Being cornered, the United States and the south Korean authorities are playing cheap tricks with the issue of a consultation forum in an attempt to block the involvement of our inspection team and blur the truth behind their fabricated plot.

The United States wanted to take advantage of the fact that we do not recognize "MAC" and came up with the idea of "discussion at the MAC"; however, it is a miscalculation.

The United States argues that the incident can be discussed at "MAC" because there is a "precedent of Democratic People's Republic of Korea-United States general-level talks" dealing with violations of the Armistice Agreement.

However, the truth behind the "Cheonan incident" has not been unveiled yet; hence, as of this moment, we cannot even talk about a violation of the Armistice Agreement.

We have already clarified our position as regards this matter; an inspection team of the National Defence Commission must be sent to uncover the truth of the incident; working-level contacts for north-south high-level military talks must be made to this end.

The Security Council should abide by the principle of objectivity and impartiality so as to distinguish truth from falsehood and take heed of our proposal aimed at giving priority to the work of getting to the bottom of the incident.

United Nations S/2010/359

Security Council

Distr.: General
6 July 2010

Original: English

Second report of the Secretary-General pursuant to paragraph 3 of resolution 1905 (2009)

I. Introduction

1. The present report is submitted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Security Council resolution 1905 (2009), in which the Council requested me to report every three months, with the first report no later than 1 April 2010, to include details on progress made in strengthening financial and administrative oversight of the current Development Fund for Iraq, as well as details on the legal issues and options to be considered with respect to implementing successor arrangements for the Development Fund and an assessment of the progress of the Government of Iraq in preparing for such arrangements.

2. The issues covered in the present report were discussed at the recent meeting of the International Advisory and Monitoring Board held in Paris on 28 and 29 April 2010, and reflect activities with regard to both the Advisory Board and the Development Fund that have taken place between the time of my first report of 1 April 2010 (S/2010/166) and 30 June 2010.

II. Major developments

A. Recent activities with regard to the Development Fund for Iraq and the International Advisory and Monitoring Board

3. At the meeting held in Paris, the Advisory Board considered the preliminary results of the audit of the Development Fund for the year ended 31 December 2009. The summary of the preliminary results of the KPMG audit are available on the Advisory Board's website. The audit continues to highlight issues of concern regarding weaknesses in controls over oil extraction and in the spending ministries. Audit fieldwork is not yet complete, as a result of delays caused by recent bombings that affected a number of ministries.

4. At the meeting, the Advisory Board approved the audit appointment process and concurred with the recommendation of the Government of Iraq to appoint PricewaterhouseCoopers to conduct the 2010 audit of the Development Fund, including an interim review of the period from 1 January 2010 to 30 June 2010.

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5. At the meeting held in Paris, the Iraqi representative to the Advisory Board, the President of the Board of Supreme Audit and the representative of the Committee of Financial Experts briefed the Advisory Board on progress in implementing earlier recommendations of the Advisory Board and in strengthening the overall framework for public financial management in Iraq.

6. The Advisory Board was also briefed by the representative of the Committee of Financial Experts on actions taken to enhance the transparency and accountability of the Development Fund, taking into account the earlier external audit findings. That briefing is published on the websites of both the Advisory Board and the Committee.

7. I welcome the fact that the Committee of Financial Experts continues to meet monthly and, in conjunction with the Board of Supreme Audit, performs detailed follow-up and investigation of recommendations contained in the independent audit reports commissioned by the Advisory Board. In addition, I welcome the fact that a number of audit recommendations have been implemented while the outstanding findings are being closely followed up.

8. I note with concern, however, that, owing to certain administrative issues, there were delays in implementing the comprehensive oil-metering system. I urge the Government of Iraq to follow up on this issue and ensure that the implementation of the comprehensive oil-metering system continues as envisaged in the time-bound action plan presented to the Security Council.

9. In April 2010, the Controller of the United Nations, Jun Yamazaki, my designated representative on the Advisory Board, briefed the Security Council on the activities of the Development Fund and the Advisory Board.

10. The next meeting of the Advisory Board, with the participation of the representative of Committee of Financial Experts, is tentatively scheduled for October 2010.

B. Assessment of the progress of the Government of Iraq in preparing for the successor arrangements for the Development Fund for Iraq

11. In paragraph 4 of Security Council resolution 1905 (2009), the Security Council called upon the Government of Iraq to put in place the necessary action plan and timeline by 1 April 2010 and to ensure the timely and effective transition to a post-Development Fund mechanism by 31 December 2010 that takes into account the standby arrangement requirements of the International Monetary Fund, includes external auditing arrangements and enables Iraq to meet its obligations as established in the provisions of paragraph 21 of resolution 1483 (2003).

12. I welcome the second quarterly report of the Government of Iraq to the Security Council. The report provides an update on the action plan and timeline for the transition to the successor arrangements for the Development Fund.

13. In this respect, I am pleased that, in its second quarterly report to the Security Council, the Government of Iraq notes that, as at 15 June 2010, measures have been implemented in accordance with the plan presented in its first quarterly report, dated 18 March 2010 (see S/2010/308, annex).

14. The Government of Iraq has received confirmation from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York of continuation of the existing mechanism in place for the Development Fund for Iraq, to be effective after 31 December 2010. Accordingly, a sub-account for compensations will be established that allows the Government of Iraq to continue to deposit 5 per cent of the proceeds of all export sales of petroleum, petroleum products and natural gas.

15. I am encouraged that the Government of Iraq, in coordination with the recommendation of Committee of Financial Experts, will continue to select an independent international auditor that will be responsible for auditing the successor entity to the Development Fund.

16. With regard to the outstanding activities under the oil-for-food programme, of the 3,009 letters of credit referenced in the note attached to my letter of 1 May 2009 to the President of the Security Council (S/2009/230), 64 letters of credit, with an approximate value of $110 million, were still outstanding as at 31 May 2010. As detailed in the note accompanying my letter of 7 December 2007 to the President of the Security Council (S/2007/725), beyond the letters of credit still outstanding as described above, the Secretariat had identified certain beneficiaries who had made claims of delivery prior to the expiry of the letter of credit and whose letters of credit had been cancelled. As mentioned in the note attached to my letter of 1 May 2009 to the President of the Security Council, I believe that, whatever option the Security Council may select for concluding all outstanding issues under the oil-for-food programme, these letters of credit should be treated in the same manner as the 64 letters of credit still outstanding. Therefore, the total number of letters of credit with outstanding claims of delivery as at 31 May 2010 would amount to 67 letters of credit.

17. I note that the Council of Ministers of Iraq has established the ministerial committee to review all of the outstanding letters of credit. In this respect, I wish to recall that the responsibility for the confirmation of the arrival of goods in Iraq was transferred to the Government of Iraq, effective as at 30 June 2004. I note, from its second quarterly report to the Security Council, that the Government of Iraq will provide the Secretariat with confirmation of the arrival of 26 outstanding letters of credit.

18. Absent the receipt by the Secretariat of the requisite confirmations of arrival of the remaining letters of credit, the Security Council may wish to consider cancelling those remaining letters of credit that have outstanding claims of delivery.

19. Irrespective of the manner selected by the Security Council for the closing of the oil-for-food programme, the conclusion of all issues outstanding should be subject to the provision by the Government of Iraq of a comprehensive indemnity with regard to all activities of the Organization, its representatives and agents in connection with the programme since its inception and with regard to the funds that have been transferred and will be transferred to the Development Fund for Iraq. I would like to recall that the conclusion of the outstanding activities under the programme should also be subject to the availability of sufficient funds for the Organization to meet the costs and expenses that have been incurred or may be incurred in future in connection with the programme, including the costs and expenses associated with the winding down of the programme and the costs and expenses arising from the cooperation of the Organization with Member States in respect of investigations and proceedings related to the programme.

20. I would like to conclude by expressing my appreciation to the Government of Iraq for its efforts to fully implement the action plan as presented in its first report to the Security Council. At the same time, I urge the Government of Iraq to continue to meet the deadlines set in that report. I look forward to keeping the Council informed of the progress of the Government of Iraq in preparing for successor arrangements for the Development Fund for Iraq.

United Nations A/64/857–S/2010/360

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
7 July 2010
English
Original: Russian

General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda item 70
Strengthening of the coordination of humanitarian and disaster relief assistance of the United Nations, including special economic assistance

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Letter dated 25 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith the text of the statement adopted by the Secretaries of the Security Councils of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member States at the conclusion of the consultations held in Moscow on 14 June 2010 concerning the situation in Kyrgyzstan (see annex).

I should be grateful if you would arrange for this statement to be circulated as a document of the General Assembly at its sixty-fourth session, under agenda item 70, and of the Security Council.

(Signed) Vitaly **Churkin**

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Annex to the letter dated 25 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Statement by the Secretaries of the Security Councils of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) member States — the Republic of Armenia, the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, the Republic of Tajikistan and the Republic of Uzbekistan

On the proposal of the President of the CSTO Council on Collective Security, President Medvedev of the Russian Federation, the Secretaries of the Security Councils held urgent consultations at the CSTO Secretariat on 14 June 2010, with the participation of the plenipotentiary representative of the Kyrgyz Republic to CSTO, to assess the situation in the Kyrgyz Republic in connection with the strained situation in the southern part of the country.

The Secretaries of the Security Councils of the CSTO member States expressed serious concern at the events occurring in recent days in southern Kyrgyzstan, which have resulted in numerous human casualties and have been accompanied by large-scale rioting, massacres and atrocities.

The participants in the consultations noted that the country has long been subject to illegal activities and rampant crime, but the efforts of the interim government of the Kyrgyz Republic thus far have been insufficient to stabilize the situation in the country.

The Secretaries of the Security Councils of the CSTO member States called upon the interim government of the Kyrgyz Republic to adopt all necessary additional measures for the speedy restoration of order in the country and the safety of its citizens.

The participants in the consultations appealed to the multi-ethnic people of Kyrgyzstan to resist provocation and incitement, and to refrain from seeking to solve the growing problems by means of violence and the resort to arms.

In the light of their assessment of the situation and in conformity with the CSTO mandate, the Secretaries of the Security Councils of the CSTO member States, with a view to a further report to the Presidents of the CSTO member States and the members of the CSTO Council on Collective Security, prepared a detailed proposal for reducing the level of inter-ethnic tension, containing the illegal activities of criminal elements and gangs, putting an end to extremist acts and strengthening security along the frontiers.

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The participants in the consultations expressed their conviction that the collective measures that have been worked out and the efforts of the law enforcement agencies of the Kyrgyz Republic would, with the support and active cooperation of the CSTO member States, bring about the conditions necessary for a stabilization of the situation in the Kyrgyz Republic.

Secretary of the National Security Council of the Republic of Armenia

A. V. **Bagdasaryan**

Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian Federation

N. P. **Patrushev**

State Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Belarus

L. S. **Maltsev**

Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Tajikistan

A. N. **Azimov**

Assistant to the President and Secretary of the Security Council of the Republic of Kazakhstan

M. M. **Tazhin**

Secretary of the National Security Council in the Office of the President of the Republic of Uzbekistan

M. I. **Ataev**

Moscow, 14 June 2010

United Nations S/2010/361

Security Council

Distr.: General
7 July 2010

Original: English

Letter dated 7 July 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

I have the honour to transmit herewith, in my delegation's capacity as the current Chair of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), for information purposes, the attached communiqué of the fifteenth Extraordinary Summit Meeting, held in Addis Ababa on 5 July 2010, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Chairperson of the IGAD Assembly, regarding the political and security situation in Somalia. It would be greatly appreciated if you could circulate the communiqué as a document of the Security Council (see annex).

(*Signed*) Aman Hassen **Bame**
Ambassador
Chargé d'affaires a.i.

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Annex to the letter dated 7 July 2010 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Ethiopia to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council

Communiqué of the fifteenth extraordinary session of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development Assembly of Heads of State and Government on Somalia

Addis Ababa, 5 July 2010

The Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) Assembly of Heads of State and Government held its fifteenth Extraordinary Summit Meeting in Addis Ababa, on 5 July 2010, under the Chairmanship of H.E. Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and Chairperson of the IGAD Assembly, to consider the political and security situation in Somalia. The Assembly was attended by: H.E. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of the Republic of Uganda; H.E. Omar Hassan El Bashir, President of the Republic of Sudan; H.E. Ismael Omar Guelleh, President of the Republic of Djibouti; H.E. Mwai Kibaki, President of the Republic of Kenya and H.E. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, President of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia.

H.E. Seyoum Mesfin, Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ethiopia and Chairperson of the IGAD Council of Ministers, briefed the Assembly on the decisions reached by the thirty-sixth IGAD Council of Ministers, held on 15 June 2010. The Hon. Kipruto Arap Kirwa, IGAD Facilitator for Somalia, briefed the Assembly on the IGAD military expert's mission to Mogadishu, which was undertaken pursuant to the decision by the thirty-sixth session of the IGAD Council of Ministers. The Assembly also received briefs from the President of the Transitional Federal Government, H.E. Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed, on the current political and security situation in Somalia.

The Summit:

Having taken note of the decisions and recommendations made by the thirty-sixth extraordinary session of the IGAD Council of Ministers, as reflected in their communiqué of 15 June 2010,

Having taken note of the report of the IGAD military expert's mission to Mogadishu,

Considering the brief by the President of the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia and his appeal for urgent support and assistance to build the capacity of the Transitional Federal Government security forces,

Recalling the previous decisions of the IGAD Assembly of Heads of State and Government and the Council of Ministers on Somalia,

1. **Notes with serious concern** the deteriorating security situation in Somalia, which poses a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of the people and the Transitional Federal Government of Somalia, the region and the international community;

2. **Reiterates** the commitment and resolve of IGAD member States to give unswerving support and assistance to the Transitional Federal Government in its struggle against extremist and terrorist groups;

3. **Underlines** that the conflict in Somalia is not a conflict among the Somalis but between the people of Somalia and international terrorist groups;

4. **Emphasizes** the need for an urgent and robust response by the international community, led by the United Nations Security Council, to arrest the escalating danger facing Somalia and the subregion and **reiterates** its previous call to the United Nations to convert the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) into a United Nations peacekeeping operation without delay;

5. **Decides** that a sustainable and reliable funding mechanism shall be established and managed jointly by AMISOM, the United Nations Political Office for Somalia (UNPOS), IGAD and the Transitional Federal Government for the sustainment of the security forces upon development and deployment in Somalia;

6. **Calls upon** the African Union to relocate as soon as possible the civilian and police components of AMISOM to Mogadishu;

7. **Regrets that** the approved level of AMISOM troops has not been achieved thus far; and **decides** to deploy 2,000 peacekeepers under AMISOM to Somalia immediately; and further **calls upon** the African Union Commission to mobilize the necessary resources, logistics and equipment for the deployment;

8. **Decides** to work with all parties, including AMISOM and the United Nations Security Council, to raise 20,000 troops to be deployed throughout the country. In this regard, the summit **embraces** the need to mobilize Somali forces internally, with possible intervention by neighbouring countries, including approaching the East African Community, and empowering them with resources and equipment;

9. **Endorses** the recommendations of the military mission to Somalia, as amended; **directs** the Chiefs of Defence Staff of IGAD member States to convene an urgent meeting and submit to the African Union Commission an action plan to deploy 2,000 peacekeepers to Somalia to enable AMISOM to reach the authorized strength of 8,100, and to review and implement, as appropriate, the recommendations made by the IGAD military mission to Somalia;

10. **Directs** the Chairperson of the Council of Ministers and the IGAD secretariat to make the necessary arrangements for the convening of the meeting of the IGAD Chiefs of Defence Staff;

11. **Decides** to render support to the Transitional Federal Government security institutions by, inter alia, training troops and trainers, establishing joint command and providing experts;

12. **Directs** the IGAD secretariat to strengthen its office in Mogadishu within 15 days and **calls upon** AMISOM, UNPOS and IGAD to establish, in Mogadishu, an operational-level coordination mechanism to strengthen and harmonize their support to the Transitional Federal Government in the areas of training, establishment of command and control structure;

13. **Expresses** appreciation to the partner countries and organizations that are currently providing financial, material and technical assistance to the Transitional Federal Government and **calls upon** them to enhance and sustain their support;

14. **Welcomes** the agreement signed between the Transitional Federal Government and Ahlu Sunna Wal Jama'a on 15 March 2010 in Addis Ababa and encourages the parties to realize the full implementation of the agreement;

15. **Encouraged** by the commitment of the leadership of the Transitional Federal Government, **urges** Transitional Federal Institutions to enhance their cohesion and unity in the face of the enormous challenges that Somalia is currently facing and in order to make progress in the accomplishment of the numerous tasks envisaged for the transitional period;

16. **Calls upon** the Chairperson of the African Union Commission to appoint an eminent person to lead the campaign for peace in Somalia. The eminent person shall be at the apex of a coordination mechanism towards reconstituting and building the State of Somalia and raising the profile of the country internationally;

17. **Calls upon** the international community to continue assisting refugees, internally displaced persons and victims of violence;

18. **Affirms** that the Djibouti process remains the sole basis for peace and reconciliation in Somalia and **rejects** the proliferation of initiatives inimical to the swift resolution of the crisis in Somalia; **urges** the Transitional Federal Government to continue the efforts it has been making to broaden its base while ensuring that the process is protected from the threat posed by extremists, whose major effort includes the dismantling of the Djibouti process;

19. **Calls upon** African Union member States that have not contributed troops to render financial and material support to Somalia;

20. **Having listened** to a brief by H.E. Ismael Omar Guelleh, President of the Republic of Djibouti, on the mediation efforts by Qatar between Djibouti and Eritrea, decides to encourage the positive developments and also underscore the necessity for Eritrea to carry out all of its obligations under United Nations Security Council resolution 1907 (2009);

21. **Decides** to remain seized of the matter.

Issued this 5th day of July 2010, in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.

United Nations A/64/858–S/2010/362

General Assembly
Security Council

Distr.: General
7 July 2010

Original: English

General Assembly
Sixty-fourth session
Agenda items 14 and 18

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Protracted conflicts in the GUAM area and their implications for international peace, security and development

The situation in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan

Letter dated 2 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government, I have the honour to draw your attention to ongoing violations of the ceasefire by the military forces of the Republic of Armenia, recorded for the month of June 2010 (see annex).

As is known, a fragile ceasefire in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict was put in place in May 1994. However, facts testify that the Armenian side regularly and deliberately violates the ceasefire by attacking and killing Azerbaijani soldiers as well as civilians residing in the territories adjacent to the Line of Contact. Over the last years, such violations have become more frequent and violent. Thus, on 18 June 2010 the occupying armed forces of Armenia committed a provocative action on the Line of Contact, resulting in casualties from both sides.

The incident took place immediately after the meeting between the Presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan, held in St. Petersburg on 17 June 2010 at the invitation of the President of the Russian Federation to pursue the dialogue between the parties on the settlement of the conflict. In their statement released on 21 June 2010 in regard to the aforementioned ceasefire violation, the Co-Chairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group pointed out, inter alia, that "[t]he use of military force, particularly at this moment, can only be seen as an attempt to damage the peace process". It is no coincidence that the next day after the meeting in St. Petersburg and the same day as the armed provocation on the Line of Contact the Permanent Representative of Armenia to the United Nations forwarded a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations (A/64/838-S/2010/326). The content of this letter is yet another solid piece of evidence of Armenia's annexationist intentions and its unwillingness to settle the conflict in accordance with international law, by political means and in a constructive manner.

By asserting that "the people of Nagorno-Karabakh have realized the right to self-determination in full compliance with the principles of international law", the

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Permanent Representative of Armenia acknowledges, in other words, that the Armenian side considers the conflict settlement process only as a means of securing the annexation of Azerbaijani territories that it has captured through military force and in which it has carried out ethnic cleansing.

In addition, the aforementioned letter contains reference to the so-called Madrid principles developed by the OSCE Minsk Group Co-Chairs, but at the same time passes over in silence that Armenia has not yet clarified whether it accepts these principles in their entirety.

It is obvious that by resorting to provocative and destabilizing actions on the Line of Contact and by misleading the international community as to the origin and essence of the conflict, Armenia attempts to discredit the ongoing political process, at the core of which is the settlement formula based on putting an end to illegal Armenian occupation, restoration of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and ensuring the peaceful coexistence of Armenian and Azerbaijani communities in the Nagorno-Karabakh region within the territorial framework of Azerbaijan.

I would also like to draw your attention to the letter dated 25 June 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Armenia addressed to the Secretary-General containing the statement by the subordinate separatist regime illegally created by Armenia, the occupying Power, in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan (A/64/849-S/2010/339).

The circulation by Armenia of a document on behalf of the illegal entity is illustrative of its consistent disrespect of the Charter of the United Nations and fundamental principles of international law.

It is obvious that, apart from attempts aimed at misleading the international community, the official Yerevan purports also to draw the attention of its own public away from Armenia's aggravating international isolation. The reasons behind the irresponsible actions of the Armenian side are reflected in, inter alia, a series of documents recently adopted by authoritative international organizations, such as the resolution of the European Parliament dated 20 May 2010 on the need for a European Union strategy for the South Caucasus and the unanimous condemnation by the international community of the illegal "parliamentary elections" held on 23 May 2010 in the occupied Nagorno-Karabakh region of Azerbaijan (see A/64/851-S/2010/345).

Azerbaijan once again expresses its regret that Armenia, instead of contributing to the ongoing political process with a view to finding as soon as possible a durable solution to the conflict based on the norms and principles of international law, gives preference to dangerous provocations and outrageous falsifications. Armenia must finally realize that there is no alternative other than putting a prompt end to its illegal occupation of Azerbaijani territories and negotiating in good faith the perspectives of peace, stability and cooperation.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter and its annex circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda items 14 and 18, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Agshin **Mehdiyev**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

Annex to the letter dated 2 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Azerbaijan to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Violation of the ceasefire by the military forces of the Republic of Armenia,[1] recorded for the month of June 2010

Date	*Time*	*Direction*	*Fire point area*	*Used Weapons*	*Casualties & Damages*
1 June	00.00-00.15		Sarijali and Javahirli villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	12:00-12:30 16:10-16:25		Gorgan village, Azerbaijan, Fuzuli region	Firearm & Machine gun	—
2 June	00.30-00.40		Javashirli village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	00:45-01:00 00:55-01:15		Gorgan village, Azerbaijan, Fuzuli region	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	15.20-15.40		Unknown heights, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	22.40-23.20		Chayli village, Terter region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
4 June	17:12-17:20		Kuropatkino village, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
5 June	01:45-01:55		Unknown heights, Fuzuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	00:05-00:10 02:10-02:30		Garakhanbayli village	Firearm & Machine gun	—
6 June	12.00-12.45 16.30-17.30		Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
7 June	05.00-05.10		Chilabort village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	17.50-18.35		Talish village, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—

[1] Settlements of the Republic of Azerbaijan included in this information are under occupation by the Republic of Armenia or close to fire point areas.

Date	*Time*	*Direction*	*Fire point area*	*Used Weapons*	*Casualties & Damages*
	23.30-23.40		Sarijali village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
8 June	15.45-16.30		Gulustan village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	19.34-19.40		Unknown heights, Khojavend region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
10 June	00.00-00.16 00.30-00.50		Giziloba and Chayli villages, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	20.20-20.25		Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	22.20-22.25 22.40-22.55		Kurapatkino village, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
11 June	15.30-15.45 15.40-15.55		Unknown heights, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	12.05-12.25 14.00-14.15 18.00-18.25 20.00-21.30		Unknown heights, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
13 June	01.15-01.30		Giziloba village, Terter region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	08.10-08.30 13.20-13.40 15.00-15.20 19.50-20.00		Unknown heights, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	16.30-16.35		Unknown heights, Fuzuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
14 June	20:45-20:50		Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
15 June	02.05-02:10 09.00-09.25 11.30-11.35		Unknown heights, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—

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Date	*Time*	*Direction*	*Fire point area*	*Used Weapons*	*Casualties & Damages*
	20.20-20.30		Javahirli village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	21.20-21.25		Jilaburt village, Terter region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
17 June	21:00-21:30 22:45-23:00		Horadiz and Ashagi Veysalli villages, Fuzuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	22.50-23.00		Garakhanbayli village, Fuzuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	Khan Yusifov
	23:45-23:50		Sarijali village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
18 June	14.00-14.20		Marzili village, Aghdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	14.00-14.21		Kuropatkino village, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	17.00-17.10		Unknown heights, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	23:30		Chayli village,Terter region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	Mubariz Ibrahimov
19 June	01.30-01.35		Unknown heights, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
20 June	08:50-10:45		Tapgaragoyunlu village, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	21.40-21.45 21.45-22.00		Garakhanbayli and Ashagi Abdulrahmanli villages, Fuzuli region, Azerbaijan		
21 June	16.30-16.40 21.30-21.35 23.00-23.15		Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	19.05-19.10		Goranboy region	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	23.35-23.50		Sarijali village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan		

Date	Time	Direction	Fire point area	Used Weapons	Casualties & Damages
22 June	17.40-17.50 21.40-21.45 23.35-23.50 00.10-00.15 00.30-00.50 04.15-04.30		Ashagi Abdulrahmanli, Ashagi Veysalli, Garakhanbayli, Ashagi Seyidahmadli villages, Fuzuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	04.00-04.20		Giziloba village, Terter region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
23 June	13.10-13.25		Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	12.55-13.20 15.05-15.20 15.05-15.40		Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
24 June	10.00-10.35 21.50-22.10 22.50-23.10 01.00-01.30		Fuzuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	02.05-02.25 02.20-02.30 02.00-02.20		Kangarli and Sarijali villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	03.45-04.20 03.40-04.15		Giziloba and Seysulan villages, Terter region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	11:10-11:20 21:05-21:15		Unknown heights, village of Ashaghi Abdulrahmanli, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
25 June	06:00-06:15 07:50-08:30		Unknown heights, village of Ashaghi Abdulrahmanli, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	22:30-22:40		Unknown heights, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	00:25-00:50		Yusifjanli and Javahirli villages, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	01:30-01:45		Chayli village, Terter region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—

Date	*Time*	*Direction*	*Fire point area*	*Used Weapons*	*Casualties & Damages*
	08:05-08:35 14:05-14:25 16:15-16:45		Unknown heights, Gulustan and Tapgaragoyunlu villages, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
26 June	17:05-17:15 21:30-21:45 23:50-00:15 00:23-00:45		Unknown heights, Ashagi Abdulrahmanli and Ashagi Sayidahmadli villages, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	09:40-09:55		Unknown heights, Jabrayil region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	01:30-01:48		Unknown heights, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	04:20-05:10		Tagibayli village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	00:40-01:40		Chayli, Hasangaya, Yarimja, Giziloba and Seysulam villages, Tartar region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
27 June	07:40-08:15 16:10-16:40 18:25-18:40 20:40-20:50		Tapgaragoyunlu and Gulustan villages, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	03:00-03:55 19:30-19:35		Unknown heights, Jabrayil region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
28 June	01:40-02:00 12:00-12:15 22:35-22:50		Javahirli village, Agdam region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	10:00-10:30 22.55-23.15 23.35-23.55		Ashaghi Abdurrahmanli, Gorgan, Horadiz and Ashaghi Seyidahmadli villages, Fizuli region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—

Date	*Time*	*Direction*	*Fire point area*	*Used Weapons*	*Casualties & Damages*
	17.30-17.35 00.30-00.40		Sarijali, Yusifjanli and Garagashli villages, Khojavand region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
29 June	00.40-00.55 02.40-02.55		Gulustan and Tapgaragoyunlu villages, Goranboy region, Azerbaijan	Firearm & Machine gun	—
	13.40-14.25 19.50-20.20				

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Agenda item 21
Question of Cyprus

Security Council
Sixty-fifth year

Letter dated 6 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General

Upon instructions from my Government and further to my letter dated 15 April 2010 addressed to you (A/64/746-S/2010/196), I have the honour to draw your attention to ongoing violations of the international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by military aircraft of the Turkish Air Force, recorded from 2 April to 28 June 2010, as follows:

On 2 and 4 April 2010, two C-160 and one C-130 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations six times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus six times.

On 6 April 2010, eighteen F-16, four F-4, one CN-235 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations 12 times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 7 April 2010, one C-130 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 10 April 2010, one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 14 April 2010, three Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 15 and 16 April 2010, one CN-235 and one C-160 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 16 April 2010, two F-16 and one C-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice.

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On 19 April 2010, one CN-235 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 20 April 2010, two F-16 and one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 21 April 2010, one C-160, two CN-235 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations five times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus five times.

On 22 and 23 April 2010, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 28 April 2010, one B-200 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 29 April 2010, two F-16, one CN-235 and one Bell Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 30 April 2010, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 3 May 2010, two F-4, one CN-235, one Bell and one Turkish military aircraft of unknown type violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 4 May 2010, one CN-235 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 5 May 2010, one C-150 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 6 May 2010, two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 10 May 2010, eleven F-16, three KC-135 coming in one formation and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 11 May 2010, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 12 May 2010, two F-16, two KC-135 and three Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations six times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 17 May 2010, one C-160 and one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

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On 18 May 2010, three Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 20 May 2010, two F-16, one CN-235 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 21 and 23 May 2010, one C-160 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 25 May 2010, one CN-235 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 26 May 2010, one C-130 and two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 27 May 2010, four F-16 and two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 27 and 28 May 2010, three Turkish military aircraft of unknown type violated international air traffic regulations five times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus five times.

On 28 and 29 May 2010, one GLF-5, one C-130 and two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 31 May 2010, one GLF-5 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 1 June 2010, six F-16, two KC-135 and two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 2 June 2010, one B-200, two CN-235 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 4 and 5 June 2010, one PA-42, four Cougar and one CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations six times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus six times.

On 7 June 2010, four Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus three times.

On 8 June 2010, one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 9 June 2010, two F-16, one C-160, one CN-235 and four Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations six times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 11 and 13 June 2010, three Cougar and two AB-412 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 14 June 2010, two CN-235, one C-130 and three Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations seven times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus seven times.

On 15 June 2010, two Cougar and one AB-412 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus twice.

On 16 June 2010, one CN-235, one UH-60, three Cougar and two AB-412 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations six times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus six times.

On 17 June 2010, four F-16, one CN-235, one GLF-5, one C-130, one Cougar and one AB-412 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations nine times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus eight times.

On 18, 19 and 20 June 2010, one CN-235, two C-160 and one AB-412 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations seven times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus seven times.

On 23 June 2010, one C-130 and two Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 24 June 2010, two F-16, one CN-235 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations twice and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On 25 and 26 June 2010, two CN-235 Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations four times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus four times.

On 28 June 2010, two F-16, one CN-235 and one Cougar Turkish military aircraft violated international air traffic regulations three times and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus.

On behalf of my Government, I strongly protest the aforementioned continued violations by Turkey and call for their immediate cessation. These violations blatantly endanger the safety of international civil aviation and contravene international law and air traffic regulations, putting the peace and stability of the region at stake.

Turkey's systematic attempts to undermine the sovereignty and unity of the Republic of Cyprus by promoting an illegal secessionist entity, arrogating to itself, inter alia, the right to control part of the airspace of the Republic of Cyprus, further complicate the efforts to build trust and confidence between the two communities. Such policies and actions provide ample demonstration of the irresponsible behaviour of a country that now serves as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

As stated in previous such letters, the continued violations of the international air traffic regulations and the national airspace of the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey should be included in the report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations operation in Cyprus.

The Government of Turkey should heed the call of the international community, abide by the Charter of the United Nations and respect the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, thus contributing to the creation of the required conditions for the achievement of a viable solution to the Cyprus problem, according to the agreed basis endorsed by numerous Security Council resolutions.

I should be grateful if you would have the present letter circulated as a document of the General Assembly, under agenda item 21, and of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Minas A. **Hadjimichael**

United Nations S/2010/364

Security Council

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8 July 2010

Original: English

Identical letters dated 7 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

Upon instruction from my Government, I have the honour to transmit herewith a letter which represents the position of the Syrian Arab Republic on the thirteenth report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) (see annex).

I would highly appreciate if the present letter and its annex were circulated as a document of the Security Council before the date of discussion of the report by the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Bashar **Ja'afari**
Ambassador
Permanent Representative

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Annex to the identical letters dated 7 July 2010 from the Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council

[Original: Arabic]

1. The report of the Secretary-General on the implementation of Security Council resolution 1701 (2006) continues the attempts to interfere in the development of Syrian-Lebanese relations and to make reference to meetings between the leaders and officials of the two countries, as though the countries' bilateral relations fell within the scope of resolution 1701 (2006). Continued interference in the countries' bilateral relations, both in form and substance, is reprehensible because Syria and Lebanon alone have the right to assess the state of those relations.

2. The Syrian Arab Republic reiterates that the question of Palestinian bases inside Lebanon is a bilateral issue that concerns Palestine and Lebanon alone; the Syrian Arab Republic has nothing to do with the matter. We therefore do not understand why the report's authors call upon Syria to help dismantle those bases. This matter falls within the purview of the Lebanese National Dialogue, which brings together all Lebanese parties and is more capable of dealing with this issue in a manner that serves Lebanon's interests. Syria does not wish to interfere in matters that are within the competence of the Lebanese Government.

3. We are surprised that the report includes the allegations of Israeli officials and the concerns of American officials regarding the smuggling of arms into Lebanon because it is unacceptable that reports by the Secretary-General should contain unsubstantiated claims and lies. The report notes that the United Nations does not have the means to verify those claims, which in itself raises questions. How is it possible that the report should give credence to Israel's claims, using language that clearly indicates the Secretariat's bias towards Israel and its supporters, and not give credence to the statements of senior Lebanese officials refuting those allegations? The problem is not whether the United Nations has the means to verify those claims, but rather the bias of some of its officials towards the claims made by Israel. Those officials believe everything Israel says and ignore the undeniable truth: Israel's continuing occupation of Syrian, Lebanese and Palestinian territory is the source of strife and tension. If we are to believe those who say they are concerned about Lebanon and its sovereignty and regional stability, then they must address the root of the problem, namely, the Israeli occupation and Israel's refusal to implement United Nations resolutions.

4. The Syrian Arab Republic reiterates its position that the report should not refer to the issue of the delineation of borders. That issue is a bilateral matter and part of the internal affairs of the two countries. Therefore, no country has a right to interfere in the matter, which is an internal affair. If the United Nations is committed to the full implementation of its resolutions, it must take meaningful action to compel Israel to implement the relevant resolutions in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.

5. The Syrian Arab Republic affirms that stability in our region is vital to international stability, and regional stability cannot be achieved as long as Israel, which considers itself to be above the law, continues to occupy Arab territory and

commit grave violations of international law and relevant Security Council resolutions. Just and comprehensive peace in the region cannot be achieved as long as the Secretariat and some of its representatives continue to deal with Israel in the manner referred to above.

6. Lastly, we should like to emphasize that the United Nations should create conditions that are conducive to positive relations between States. It should not interfere in States' affairs or bilateral relations and create problems between them. It is also wrong to support one party over another in a particular State because, in the case of Lebanon, that would threaten the achievements made through the painstaking efforts of many parties, in particular Syria, that are solicitous of Lebanon's unity, security, stability, sovereignty and independence.